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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Clayton Adams appeals from the Judgment and Commitment entered upon a jury
verdict finding him guilty of one count of second degree murder and one count of
aggravated battery. Mr. Adams was sentenced to a unified term of life, with twenty-five
years fixed, for the murder conviction, and a consecutive term of ten years, with three
years fixed, for the aggravated battery conviction. Mr. Adams timely appealed and
raised the following issues in his Appellant's Brief.
First, Mr. Adams asserts that he was denied his constitutional right to a jury trial
and right to a fair trial when the district court failed to remove a juror who candidly
admitted that she felt it was unfair that a court in a criminal trial would withhold evidence
from the jury. Juror 608 stated that she would merely do her best not to hold against
Mr. Adams, instances during the trial where information was withheld from her. Second,
Mr. Adams asserts that he was denied his right to a fair trial by the prosecutor appealing
to the passions of the jury when, during closing argument, the prosecutor asked the jury
to give the alleged victims, and Mr. Adams, 'Tustice." Third, Mr. Adams asserts that if
the above errors are deemed individually harmless, the combination of having a biased
juror sit in his case and the prosecutorial misconduct that occurred requires reversal of
his conviction under the doctrine of cumulative error. Finally, Mr. Adams asserts that
the district court abused its discretion by executing an excessive sentence in light of the
specific facts and circumstances of this case.

In its Respondent's Brief, the State makes numerous arguments in support of
their request that this Court affirm Mr. Adams' conviction and sentence.

This Reply

Brief is necessary to address some of the State's arguments.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings were previously
articulated in Mr. Adams's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply
Brief, but are incorporated herein by reference thereto.

1.

Did the district court deny Mr. Adams his constitutional rights to a jury trial and to
a fair trial when, after Juror 608 candidly admitted that she would hold any
perceived withholding of information against the defendant, the district court
denied Mr. Adams the ability to get an unequivocal assurance from Juror 608
that she would not hold such a withholding of information against Mr. Adams and
when the district court failed to remove the juror?

2.

Did the prosecutor violate Mr. Adams' due process right to a fair trial by
committing misconduct in appealing to the passions and prejudices of the jury by
asking them to provide ''justice' to the alleged victims and "justice" to Mr. Adams?

'

In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Adams also raised the issues, "Does the combination of
the above errors, even if individually harmless, require reversal of Mr. Adams'
convictions under the doctrine of cumulative error?" and "Did the district court abuse its
discretion by executing an excessive sentence upon Mr. Adams in light of his young
age, the role alcohol played in the instant offense and his desire for treatment, the
support he enjoys from his family and friends, and his remorse?" Mr. Adams'
arguments in support of his claims of error are fully articulated in the Appellant's Brief
and need not be repeated in this Reply Brief but are incorporated herein by reference
thereto.

ARGUMENT

1.
The District Court Denied Mr. Adams His Constitutional Riahts To A Jurv Trial And To A
Fair Trial When, After Juror 608 Candidlv Admitted That She Would Hold Anv Perceived
Withholding Of lnformation Aaainst The Defendant, The District Court Denied
Mr. Adams The Abilitv To Get An Unequivocal Assurance From Juror 608 That She
Would Not Hold Such A Withholdina Of lnformation Against Mr. Adams And When The
District Court Failed To Remove The Juror
A.

Introduction
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Adams asserted that because the district court

denied Mr. Adams the right to require Juror 608 to unequivocally promise not to hold
any perceived withholding of information against him, and because the district court
failed to remove Juror 608, Mr. Adams was denied his right to a jury trial, and a fair trial,
and his conviction must be vacated.

In response, the State makes four main

arguments. First, the State argues that because Mr. Adams did not move to remove
Juror 608 for cause, the issue is not preserved for appeal. (Respondent's Brief, p.13.)
Second, relying upon out of state precedent, the State asserts that the district court was
correct in denying Mr. Adams the ability to obtain a "promise" that Juror 608 would not
be biased against him and did not "curtail" Mr. Adams ability to determine whether Juror
608 could be impartial through "proper questioning." (Respondent's Brief, pp.13-15.)
Third, the State asserts that Mr. Adams failed to show that Juror 608 should have been
struck for bias.

(Respondent's Brief, pp.15-17.)

Finally, the State asserts that

Mr. Adams cannot establish that he was prejudiced by Juror 608 remaining on the jury.
(Respondent's Brief, pp.18-24.) Each of these arguments is discussed below.

B.

The District Court's Denial Of Mr. Adams' Abilitv To Obtain An Unecluivocal
Assurance From Juror 608 That She Would Not Use The Withholdina Of
Information Aqainst Him And The District Court's Failure To Remove Juror 608
Are Ripe For Appellate Review
The State asserts that: "It is well settled in ldaho that challenges to the suitability

of jurors must be made before the jury is empanelled." (Respondent's Brief, p.13 (citing
I.C. 3 19-2006; Stafe v. Hansen, 127 ldaho 675, 678, 904 P.2d 945, 948 (Ct. App. 1995)
(in turn citing State

V.

Yon, 115 ldaho 907, 771 P.2d 925 (Ct. App. 1989); State v.

Ruybal, 102 ldaho 885, 643 P.2d 835 (Ct. App. 1982)))) The State further asserts that:
"Failure to challenge a juror for cause indicates satisfaction with the jury selected."
(Respondent's Brief, p.13 (citing Stafe v. Bifz, 93 ldaho 239, 243, 460 P.2d 374, 378
(1969).)

The State argues that Mr. Adams "newly found appellate disgruntlement

should not be considered." (Respondent's Brief, p.13.) The State's argument in this
section of its brief fails to acknowledge that that Mr. Adams raised his claim under the
doctrine of fundamental error and that ldaho precedent (including precedent cited by the
State) makes clear that such a claimed error can be raised for the first time on appeal.'
In Hansen, cited by the State, the ldaho Court of Appeals stated, "[wle have
previously held that when a challenge to the jury is not raised in a timely fashion, we will
not consider it on appeal, unless, the appellant can show that the error constituted
fundamental error." Hansen, 127 ldaho at 678, 904 P.2d at 948 (citing State v. Yon,
115 ldaho 907, 909, 771 P.2d 925, 927 (Ct. App. 1989) (emphasis added).)
Furthermore, in Bitz, the ldaho Supreme Court was not presented with the question of
whether the potential juror bias in that case was a question of fundamental error; rather,

-

'

he State later recognizes that a challenge to the jury selection process can be raised
for the first time on appeal under a fundamental error claim. (Respondent's Brief, p.15.)

the Court was presented with the question of whether the district court erred in denying
the defendant's motion for a change of venue. Bitz, 93 ldaho at 242-43, 460 P.2d at
377-78.) Finally, as articulated in the Appellant's Brief, the ldaho Supreme Court has
recently as last year entertained a challenge to a biased juror for the first time on appeal
under the doctrine of fundamental error. (Appellant's Brief, pp.14-16 (citing State v.
Johnson, 145 ldaho 970, 978-79, 188 P.3d 912, 920-21 (2008).) Thus, the State's
claim that this issue is not ripe for appellate review is in conflict with established ldaho
precedent and is without merit.
C.

The District Court's Denial Of Mr. Adams' Reauest Of A "Promise" From Juror
608 Not To Hold A Perceived Withholdina Of Information Aaainst Mr. Adams
Denied Mr. Adams The Abilitv To Get An Uneauivocal Assurance That Juror 608
Would Not Be Biased
The State next attempts to argue that the district court did not curtail Mr. Adams'

ability to determine whether Juror 608 could be fair and impartial; rather, the district
court was merely properly concerned about using the term "promise." (Respondent's
Brief, pp.13-15.) Citing precedent from other jurisdictions that have nothing to do with
the issue of juror bias, the State argues the district court was merely concerned with the
form of the question. (Respondent's Brief, pp.13-15.) The State's argument is without
merit.
The primary authority the State cites for its proposition that the district court was
merely correctly concerned about using the term "promise" is Sfafe v. Holmquest, 243
S.W.3d 444 (Mo. App. 2007). In Holmquest, the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western
District, was presented with a claim that the prosecution's inquiry into the prospective
jurors' credibility determination of an accomplice's testimony, where the accomplice may

accomplice may have been more culpable but given a deal in exchange for their
testimony, was an improper attempt to cause the jury to commit to an assessment of the
witness' credibility or to predispose the jury.

Id. at 450-52. The Court recited the

applicable legal standards and found that the prosecutor's questions were valid as they
were not an attempt to predispose the jury to the witness' credibility or to commit to
such a determination and found no error. Id. The Holmquist case had nothing to do
with the issue raised by Mr. Adams; namely, that the district court prevented Mr. Adams
from determining whether Juror 608 would be biased against him and the fact that Juror
608 was in fact biased and sat on the jury.3
It should be noted that one of the cases relied upon by the Holmquist Court is
State

V.

Clark, 981 S.W.2d 143 (Mo banc 1998). The Holmquisf Court stated, "'A

defendant is entitled to a fair and impartial jury.' State v. Clark, 981 S.W.2d 143, 146
(Mo. banc 1998). The purpose of voir dire is to discover potential bias or prejudice in
order to select a fair and impartial jury. Id. For this reason, liberal latitude is allowed in
the examination of potential jurors. Id." Holmquisf at 451 (internal citations in original).
In Clark, the Missouri Supreme Court, en banc, held that the district court in a capital
murder case improperly denied defense counsel the ability to determine whether the
jurors could be impartial knowing that the alleged victim was three years old. See Clark,
generally. The Court recognized that asking only generic questions about whether the
jurors could follow the law was insufficient. Id. 981 S.W.2d. at 147. (citation omitted.)

The additional cases cited by the State from Texas and Mississippi (Respondent's
Brief, p.14 (citing Sanchez v. State, 165 S.W.3d 707, 712 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) and
Nicholson v. State, 761 So.2d 924, 927 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000) (further citation omitted)),
are equally unavailing but are not discussed further in this brief.

"If only generic questions are asked, biased jurors 'could respond affirmatively,
personally confident that [their] dogmatic views are fair and impartial, while leaving the
specific concern unprobed."' Id. (quoting Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 738 (1992);
see also Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794 (1975).) Here, the State asserts that "Nothing
precluded [Mr. Adams' counsel] from asking juror 608 whether she would follow the
instructions by the court, decide the case based only on the evidence presented at trial,
and be fair to both sides." (Respondent's Brief, p.15.) This limited, generic, questioning
is exactly the kind of questioning the Missouri Court holds is insufficient.
Regardless, it is not necessary for this Court to seek authority from other states
as ldaho Courts have spoken to the issue of juror bias and a defendant's ability to
explore such bias.

As noted in the Appellant's Brief (pp.11-13), after examining

precedent from other jurisdictions and analyzing the right to a trial by a jury comprised
of unbiased jurors under the provisions of the United States Constitution, the ldaho
Constitution, and the relevant statutes, the ldaho Court of Appeals found as follows:
We agree with those courts that have concluded that any justified doubt
that a venireman can "stand indifferent in the cause" ought to be resolved
in favor of the accused. Justus v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 971, 266
S.E.2d 87, 90 (1980). See also [Unifed States v.] Gonzalez, 214 F.3d
[1109], 1114 [(gth Cir.2000)]. This resolution gives full effect to the
language in I.C. § 19-2019(2), which calls for disqualification of a juror
who exhibits a state of mind that "leads to the inference that he will not act
with entire impartiatity." In our view, when a juror admits bias, and gives no
unequivocal assurance of the ability to be impartial despite several efforts
by the court or counsel to elicit such an assurance, an inference that he
will not act with entire impartiality becomes inescapable.
State v. Hauser, 143 ldaho 603, 609-610, 150 P.3d 296, 302-303 (Ct. App. 2007).
Furthermore, while not explicitly adopting the Court of Appeals' reasoning in Hauser, the
ldaho Supreme Court recently entertained an argument citing Hauser as precedent,

wherein the Court did not reject the Court of Appeals' holding; rather, the Supreme
Court merely distinguished the facts of the case presented from the facts presented in
Hauser. See State v. Johnson, 145 ldaho 970,979-980, 188 P.3d 912,921-922 (2008).
Whether it is referred to as an "unequivocal assurance" or a "promise," a criminal
defendant has a right to a jury comprised of individuals who will be unbiased, not try to
be unbiased, and the State's argument has no merit.
D.

Juror 608 Admitted Her Bias And Was Specificallv Asked Whether She Would
Promise Not To Hold Her Bias Aqainst Mr. Adams Personally
The State next makes the factual argument that "juror 608 did not say, nor was

she asked, whether she would assume from repeated trips outside the courtroom that
evidence damaging to Adams was being kept out of the jury's view, or whether she
would hold such assumption against Adams in determining his case." (Respondent's
Brief, p.16.)

The State asserts that, "the district court's focus was on preventing

defense counsel from obtaining a 'promise' with regard to the possibility that juror 608
might become dissatisfied with counsel if there were repeated trips outside the
courtroom: 'Counsel, with all due respect, I'm not going to allow you to require her to
promise."' (Respondent's Brief, p.17 (citation omitted).) The State makes these factual
arguments in an attempt to support its argument that the legal holding in Hause# does
not apply. However, the State misrepresents the facts in this case and their legal
argument is without merit.
As is noted in the both the Appellant's Brief (pp.2-4) and the Respondent's Brief
(pp.10-12), after Juror 608 discussed her displeasure with sitting as a juror yet having

State v. Hauser, 143 ldaho 603, 150 P.3d 296 (Ct. App. 2007).

information she may feel is important withheld from her, the following exchange took
place:
MR. ONANUBOSI (defense counsel): You know, there might be an
occasion, an instance or occasion where we might have to take up some
legal issues, and we might have to do that in the absence of the jury.
JUROR NO. 608: Yes.
MR. ONANUBOSI: That we might have to excuse the jury. Will
you promise me that you will not hold that against either myself or the
State if that happens in this case?
JUROR NO. 608: Do I promise? No.
MR. ONANUBOSI: You cannot promise that?
JUROR NO. 608: (Shakes head.)
MR. ONANUBOSI: Okay. At least will you be willing to
promise me that you will not be willing to hold that against Mr.
Adams, the individual I'm trying to help over here?

THE COURT: Counsel, with all due respect, I'm not going to
allow you to require her to promise.
MR. ONANUBOSI: Okay. Will you be willing to do your best to
make sure if that happens in this case, you do not hold that against
Mr. Adams, the individual I'm trying to help in this case?
JUROR NO. 608: Yes, I will do my best.
MR. ONANUBOSI: You will do your best. That's all we can ask
for.
(Tr., Vol.ll, p.313, L.12

- p.314,

L.12. (emphasis added).) The State's argument that

defense counsel only asked Juror 608 about her bias towards the attorneys is not
reflected in the record. Counsel for Mr. Adams was seeking a promise that Juror 608
would be willing not to hold her bias against Mr. Adams. Because of the district court's

interruption and clear ruling that defense counsel could not require her to promise not to
hold her bias against Mr. Adams, Juror 608 was only required to "do [her] best."
Despite defense counsel's statement, a juror's promise that she will "do [her]
best" not to hold her admitted bias against the defendant is not "all we can ask." The
Court of Appeals made it clear in Hauser that a juror's promise to "try" is not enough.
State v. Hauser, 143 ldaho 603, 609-10, 150 P.3d 296 302-03 (Ct. App. 2007). A
potential juror must provide an unequivocal assurance of their ability to be impartial, if
not, "an inference that he will not act with entire impartiality becomes inescapable." Id.
The State's attempt to escape the inescapable by misstating the facts of this case leads
to the conclusion that the State's argument is without merit.
E.

The Error Was Not Harmless
The State next argues that Mr. Adams was not prejudiced by Juror 608

remaining on the jury.

(Respondent's Brief, pp.18-24.)

In his Appellant's Brief,

Mr. Adams first asserted that, like the error found in Hauser, the error in this case can
not be found harmless. (Appellant's Brief, pp.18-19.) In Hauser, after finding that the
defendant's rights were violated by having a juror sit on her case that would only "try" to
be fair, the Court of Appeals did not apply a harmless error test, i.e. whether "the court
[can] declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" (See State v.
Christiansen, 144 ldaho 463, 471, 163 P.3d 1175, 1183 (2007) (citing Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967), accord, State v.
Robbins, 123 ldaho 527, 850 P.2d 176 (1993)).) Hauser, 143 Idaho at 610-11, 150
P.3d 296, 303-04.

However, the Court of Appeals did recognize that the juror's

admission that he would give more weight to and tend to believe a Kootenai County

Sheriff's officer's testimony over that of the defendant "is particularly disquieting in this
trial because the State's case turned largely upon the testimony of a detective who had
interviewed Hauser, and this detective was the 'victim' of Hauser's alleged willful
concealment of information." Id. 143 Idaho at 610, 150 P.3d at 603. Because of the
fact that having a biased juror sit on a defendant's case leads inextricably to the
conclusion that the defendant did not have a fair trial in front of unbiased jurors,
Mr. Adams asserts that this Court should find that the error was not harmless.
Mr. Adams recognizes that Juror 608's bias went to a specific set of
circumstances, i.e., knowingly being deprived of information that she may want to know.
Mr. Adams thus argued in his Appellant's Brief that even if this Court reviews what
transpired in this case, in light of Juror 608's admitted bias, this Court cannot declare
the error harmless. Mr. Adams' arguments in support of this claim are articulated in his
Appellant's Brief and need not be repeated in detail in this brief herein but are
incorporated by reference thereto. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.19-22.) However, the
State's arguments as to why it believes the error is harmless, demonstrates the futility in
attempting to apply a harmless error analysis in a situation such as this, where the very
process Juror 608 was disgruntled with and the very process that she would only "do
her best" not to hold against the defendant occurred during the trial.
Regarding the exclusion of Defense Exhibit A (Mikeal Campbell's Written
Statement) the State argues that "an attentive juror 608 would not have thought that any
evidence damaging to Adams was being kept from the jury."

(Respondent's Brief,

p.19.) The State further asserts:
Hearing all of the discourse leading up to the jury's exclusion from the
courtroom, juror 608 would haveplainly understood that Defense Exhibit A

was simply repetitive of Campbell's testimony, and intended to buttress his
testimony after it have been impeached by Adams' triat counsel.
(Respondent's Brief, p.20.) In essence, the State speculates as to what Juror 608
improperly speculated and argued that she would not have speculated anything
negative against Mr. Adams.
Regarding State's Exhibit 33 (Deputy Miller's Tape Recording), the State
guesses that Juror 608 would not have speculated "that anything damaging about
Adams had been kept out of the trial

- unless she engaged in totally unrestrained

speculation." (Respondent's brief, pp.21-22.) This time, the State guesses as to what
Juror 608 did not speculate unless her speculation was unrestrained.
Finally, regarding Deputy Faulhaber's Volunteered Comment, the State guesses
that after Deputy Faulhaber stated that she had "dealt with Mr. Adams before and the
jury was sent out, Juror 608 would not have speculated that the defense was trying to
keep out evidence sought by the State apparently because juror 608 would have
realized the State's witness volunteered the information rather than being directly asked
whether she had "dealt with Mr. Adams in the past. The State then asks this Court to
join in its guessing.
The problem with the State's argument, beyond the fact that it is based on pure
speculation, is the fact that it assumes that Juror 608 would speculate in a manner the
State determines is reasonable. However, it is the act of speculating itself that makes
Juror 608 an unreasonable, biased juror. Mr. Adams has a right to an impartial jury of
12 individuals all of whom can give an unequivocal assurance (i.e. "promise") that they
will not be biased against the defendant, including not speculating about issues
discussed outside their presence and holding it against the defendant, not the right to

11 such jurors and one who only has to do her best not to hold her own speculations
against the defendant.
Juror 608 admitted that in her previous experience she felt like information was
being kept from her and then later found out, from the prosecutor, what the information
being kept from her was

- she did not like it and basically admitted that would hold it

against the parties. In this case, she was told, that all she had to do was try not to hold
interruptions in the proceedings, where the jury was sent out for the parties to discuss
what evidence would be admitted, against the defendant. The State now asks this
Court to speculate that Juror 608's speculations were not against Mr. Adams.
The State relies upon the ldaho Supreme Court's holding finding that a "single
instance of the judge instructing the jury to disregard evidence presented by a specialist
[the very issue that the juror in question in that case stated he would not disregard], is
insufficient to show Johnson sustained any prejudice by juror 85's presence on the
panel." (Respondent's Brief, p.19 (citing Sfafe v. Johnson, 145 ldaho 970, -,

188

P.3d 912, 922 (2008) (internal parenthetical added).) Notably, the Supreme Court did
not engage in speculation as to what the juror in that case would have believed based
upon his statements during voir dire. This Court should not engage in speculation
either.
Fatal to the State's argument is that this type of speculation, by its very nature,
cannot lead this Court to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt, that Juror 608's
presence on the jury was harmless. Even under the State's analysis, this Court can
only speculate that the error was harmless. Speculation does not support a finding
beyond a reasonable doubt, of harmlessness. The State's argument is without merit.

The Prosecutor Violated Mr. Adams' Due Process Riqht To A Fair Trial By Committinq
Misconduct In Appealing To The Passions And Preiudices Of The Jurv Bv Askina Them
To Provide "Justice" To The Alleged Victims And "Justice" To Mr. Adams
A.

Introduction
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Adams asserted that the prosecutor committed

misconduct during his rebuttal closing argument by appealing to the passions and
prejudices of the jury by exclaiming that the State was seeking "justice" for Mikeal
Campbell, Stephen Maylin, and Tyler Gorely, and by seeking "justice" for Clayton
Adams. (Appellant's Brief, pp.22-27.) In response, the State argues that the prosecutor
asking the jury to mete out 'Tustice" was not misconduct and did not constitute
fundamental error. (Respondent's Brief, pp.24-30.) Mr. Adams now addresses the
State's arguments.
B.

Regardless Of Whether The Prosecutor's Calls For Justice Were ForThe Crimes
Alleged, The Prosecutors Calls Constitute Misconduct And The Error Was Not
Harmless
The State first argues that the "prosecutor's calls to justice were actually 'for' the

various crimes Adams was charged with committing

- not the brief asides partially

describing each person's role on the early morning of March 11, 2006." (Respondent's
Brief, p.28 (citations omitted).) The State further argues that asking the jury to mete out
"justice' is not improper. (Respondent's Brief, pp.28-29.) To reiterate, the misconduct
that Mr. Adams alleges stems from the following passage: First the state argued, "I just
want to make it real clear what it is that we are asking for. We are asking for justice."
(Tr., Vol.lll, p.973, Ls.22-23 (emphasis added).) The state continued:

We spoke at the beginning about how on March Ilth
of '06, Clayton
Adams was in the driver's seat, how he's not anymore, that you are. And
as you take that wheel and we slide into the back seat, mere passengers
at this point, we ask one thing, that you take us home, home to justice,
justice for Mike Campbell who watched his friend die, justice for Stephen
Maylin who got stabbed trying to run away from someone he didn't even
know, justice for Tyler Gorley whose death is the reason we are here and
whose life is insulted by the story that he wants you to believe, and justice
for Clayton Adams who did these things, who you know committed these
crimes, and who thought so little of it, that he went and bought beer.
We ask for justice. Thank you.
(Tr., Vol.lll, p.974, L.12 - p.975, L.l (emphasis added).)
Mr. Adams' arguments as to why these comments constituted misconduct are
contained in his Appellant's Brief and need not be repeated in detail herein but are
incorporated by reference. However, the State's apparent claim that such calls for
'Tustice" are non-objectionable if they are "for" the various crimes that a defendant is
charged with is logically flawed. A prosecutor's appeals to the passions and prejudices
of the jury do not become un-objectionable merely because the prosecutor ties those
appeals to the crimes alleged. Whether it be a claim that the jury should be upset when
a defendant raises a certain defense to a crime charged (see Stafe v. Phillips, 144
ldaho 82, 156 P.3d 583 (Ct. App. 2007), or whether it be an appeal to racial or ethnic
prejudices of the jurors in the hopes of convincing the jury to convict the defendant of
the crime charged (see State v. Romero-Garcia, 139 ldaho 199, 203, 75 P.3d 1209,
1213 (Ct. App. 2003)), any time a prosecutor is asking the jury to convict a defendant
based upon anything other than the evidence that was presented, and the law upon
which they are instructed, the prosecutor has committed misconduct.
As the State noted, the prosecutor argued to the jury:

We are asking that you find Clayton Adams guilty of three counts of
attempted robbery for demanding money from the back seat passengers
and threatening to stab them if he didn't get the cash.
We are asking that you find Clayton Adams guilty of aggravated battery for
stabbing Stephen Maylin as he tried to run away.
And we are asking that you find Clayton Adams guilty of first degree
murder for stabbing Tyler Gorley five times and leaving him to die in the
road.
(Tr., Vol.lll, p.973, L.24

-

p.974, L.8. (see also Respondent's Brief, p.27).) These

arguments were perfectly legitimate and presumably based upon the evidence the
prosecutor believed supported a guilty verdict and the law as instructed. However,
making these legitimate arguments does not excuse the prosecutor from later appealing
to the passions and the prejudices of the jury by asking the jury to grant the alleged
victims 'Tustice." "Justice" is neither a factual finding nor a legal standard that the jury
should have been concerned with. The State's argument is without merit.
The State further argues that even if the prosecutor's requests for "justice" were
improper, the error did not amount to fundamental error. (Respondent's Brief, pp.2930.)

Mr. Adams' arguments as to why the prosecutor's comments constitute

fundamental error and why such error is not harmless in this case are contained in the
Appellant's Brief and need not be repeated in this Reply Brief but are incorporated
herein by reference.
C.

The Duties Of The Prosecutor On Closina Araument
The State articulates the following:

Adams has not divulged any authority holding that a prosecutor's call for
"justice" constitutes misc~nduct.~
Such an argument begs two questions;
(1) how is a defendant harmed by a request for justice? and (2) what,
instead of justice, should prosecutors be asking of juries? Adams'
argument runs counter to common sense.
(Respondent's Brief, p.29.) Mr. Adams will now answer the State's questions.
First, a defendant would not normally be harmed by a prosecutor's request for
justice provided that the prosecutor was truly seeking "justice." A prosecutor's duty to
seek justice was amply described by the United States Supreme Court and quoted by
the ldaho Supreme Court.
'The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party
to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose
interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shaN win a
case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and
very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that
guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with
earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike
hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his
duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a
wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring
about ajust one.'
Sfafe

V.

Wilbanks, 95 ldaho 346, 353-54, 509 P.2d 331, 338-39 (1973) (quoting

Bergerv. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (emphasis added)). However, the
prosecutor's definition of "justice" in this case is not what the Berger and Wilbanks
Courts had in mind.
When a prosecutor defines the term "justice" as being served only by a
defendant's conviction and then provides this definition to the jury, the defendant is

Mr. Adams asserted in his Appellant's Brief, that the prosecutor's calls for 'justice" in
this case were an appeal to the passions and prejudices of the jury and cited authorities
holding that when a prosecutor appeals to the passions and prejudices of a jury, the
prosecutor commits misconduct. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.22-26.)

harmed. This harm stems from the danger that, rather than deciding the case based
upon the evidence presented and the law upon which they are instructed, the jury will
determine the case based upon a desire to make amends for, as the prosecutor argued
in this case, some erroneous perception that the jury owes it to the alleged victims to
find the defendant guilty. Such a requests harms the defendant because his right to a
fair trial, protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article
I, § 13 of the ldaho Constitution, is denied. See U.S CONST.amd XIV; ID.CONST
art. 1 § 13.
To answer the State's second question, there is an abundance of sources
defining exactly what the State should (and should not be) be asking of juries. First the jury instructions. In this case, Jury lnstruction Number 4 instructed that to decide
the case they were to determine the facts and apply those facts to the law that they
were instructed upon. (J.I. 4.) They were in further instructed that "Neither sympathy
not prejudice should influence you in your deliberations." ( I 4.)

Jury lnstruction

Number 4 in this case corresponds to ldaho Criminal Jury lnstruction 104

-

TRIAL

PROCEDURE & EVIDENCE. See w w w . i s c . i d a h o . g o v l ~ ~ ~ U ~ ~ / 1 0 0 ~ R ~ . R ~ ~ ~
The American Bar Association has articulated its own standards governing what
prosecutors should and should not ask of jurors.

"ABA Criminal Justice Section

Standards, Prosecution Function, Standard 3-5.8, Arguments to the Jury" reads as
follows:
(a) In closing argument to the jury, the prosecutor may argue all
reasonable inferences from evidence in the record. The prosecutor
should not intentionally misstate the evidence or mislead the jury as to the
inferences it may draw.
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(b) The prosecutor should not express his or her personally belief or
opinion as to the truth or falsity of any testimony or evidence or the guilt of
the defendant.
(c) The prosecutor should not make arguments calculated to appeal to
the prejudices of the jury.
(d) The prosecutor should refrain from argument which would divert the
jury from its duty to decide the case on the evidence.
See www.abanet.orglcrimjust/standardslpfunc~blk.htm1.7
Finally, ldaho precedent is also an excellent source for determining what a
prosecutor should and should not be asking of juries. In Phillips, the Court of Appeals
provides a summary, complete with citations, of the puipose of closing argument and
what a prosecutor should refrain from arguing:
Closing argument "serves to sharpen and clarify the issues for
resolution by the trier of fact in a criminal case." Herring v New York, 422
U.S. 853, 862, 95 S.Ct 2550, 2555, 45 L.Ed.2d 593, 600 (1975). Its
purpose "is to enlighten the jury and to help the jurors remember and
interpret the evidence." Sfate V. Reynolds, 120 ldaho 445, 450, 816 P.2d
1002, 1007 (Ct.App.1991). "Both sides have traditionally been afforded
considerable latitude in closing argument to the jury and are entitled to
discuss fully, from their respective standpoints, the evidence and the
inferences to be drawn therefrom." Sfafe v. Sheahan, 139 ldaho 267, 280,
77 P.3d 956, 969 (2003).
Considerable latitude, however, has its limits, both in matters
expressly stated and those implied. Closing argument should not include
counsel's personal opinions and beliefs about the credibility of a witness or
the guilt or innocence of the accused. Id.; Stafe v. Garcia, 100 ldaho 108,
110-11, 594 P.2d 146, 14849 (1979); Sfafe v. Lovelass, 133 ldaho 160,
169, 983 P.2d 233, 242 (Ct.App.1999); Sfafe v. Brown, 131 ldaho 61, 69,
951 P.2d 1288, 1296 (Ct.App.1998); Sfafe v. Priest, 128 ldaho 6, 14, 909
P.2d 624, 632 (Ct.App.1995); State v. Ames, 109 ldaho 373, 376, 707
P.2d 484, 487 (Ct.App.1985). Nor should it include disparaging comments
about opposing counsel, Sheahan, 139 ldaho at 280, 77 P.3d at 969;
Sfafe v. Page, 135 ldaho 214, 223, 16 P.3d 890, 899 (2000); Brown, 131
ldaho at 69, 951 P.2d at 1296; State v. Barufh, 107 ldaho 651, 657, 691
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P.2d 1266, 1272 (Ct.App.1984), or inflammatory words employed in
describing a witness or defendant. State v. Hairston, 133 ldaho 496, 507,
988 P.2d 1170, 1181 (1999); Sfafe v. Kuhn, 139 ldaho 710, 715-16, 85
P.3d 1109, 1114-15 (Ct.App.2003). A closing argument may not
misrepresent or mischaracterize the evidence, Stafe v. Raudebaugh, 124
ldaho 758, 769, 864 P.2d 596, 607 (1993); State v. Grjfiths, 101 ldaho
163, 166, 610 P.2d 522, 525 (1980); State v. Tupis, 112 ldaho 767, 77172, 735 P.2d 1078, 1082-83 (Ct.App.1987), unduly emphasize irrelevant
facts introduced at trial, State v. Smoot, 99 ldaho 855, 860, 590 P.2d
1001, 1006 (1978), refer to facts not in evidence, Griffiths, 101 ldaho at
166, 610 P.2d at 525; State v. Marfinez, 136 ldaho 521, 525, 37 P.3d 18,
22 (Ct.App.2001); State v. Corfez, 135 ldaho 561, 565-66, 21 P.3d 498,
502-03 (Ct.App.2001); Lovelass, 133 ldaho at 169, 983 P.2d at 242, argue
as substantive evidence matters admitted for limited evidentiary purposes,
Hairston, 133 ldaho at 507-08, 988 P.2d at 1181-82, or misrepresent the
law or the reasonable doubt burden. Raudebaugh, 124 ldaho at 769, 864
P.2d at 607; Lovelass, 133 ldaho at 168, 983 P.2d at 241; State v.
Missamore, 114 ldaho 879, 882, 761 P.2d 1231, 1234 (Ct.App.1988). The
credibility of a witness may not be bolstered or attacked by reference to
religious beliefs, Stafe v. Sanchez, 142 ldaho 309, 318, 127 P.3d 212, 221
(Ct.App.2005), and appeals to racial or ethnic prejudices are prohibited.
State v. Romero-Garcia, 139 ldaho 199, 203, 75 P.3d 1209, 1213
(Ct.App.2003). In a criminal case, a prosecutor may not directly or
indirectly comment on a defendant's invocation of his constitutional right to
remain silent, either at trial or before trial, for the purposes of inferring
guilt. State v. Strouse, 133 ldaho 709, 713-f4, 992 P.2d 158, 162-63
(1999); State v. Hodges, 105 ldaho 588, 592, 671 P.2d 1051, 1055
(1983); State v. McMurry, 143 ldaho 312, 314, 143 P.3d 400, 402
(Ct.App.2006); Sfafe v. Sfefani, 142 ldaho 698, 700-03, 132 P.3d 455,
457-60 (Ct.App.2005). Lastly, and of particular importance to the present
case, appeals to emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury through use of
inflammatory tactics are impermissible. Raudebaugh, 124 ldaho at 769,
864 P.2d at 607; State v. Smith, 117 ldaho 891, 898, 792 P.2d 916, 923
(1990); Stafe v. LaMere, 103 ldaho 839, 844, 655 P.2d 46, 51 (1982);
Griffifhs, 101 ldaho at 168,610 P.2d at 527.
Phillips, 144 ldaho at 86-87, 156 P.3d at 587-88 (footnote omitted.) Thus, there is an
abundance of sources available not only answer the State's question as to what
prosecutors should be asking of juries, but also what prosecutor's should not be asking
of juries. The State's apparent assertion that the prosecutor in this case did exactly
what prosecutors are supposed to do, and could not do anything else, is without merit.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Adams respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction and remand
his case to the district court. Alternatively, Mr. Adams requests that this Court reduce
his sentences as it deems appropriate.
DATED this 14'~day of January, 2009.
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